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In terms of the similarity of matrices, by combining the dual oper-
ator and the linear mapping with respect to Hamiache’s associated
game on the game space, the Shapley value for TU-games is axio-
matized as the unique value verifying dual similar associated con-
sistency, continuity, and the inessential game property.
© 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
A cooperative gamewith transferable utility (TU) is a pair 〈N, v〉, where N is the ﬁnite set of n players
and v : 2N → R is the characteristic function assigning to each coalition S ∈ 2N \ {∅} theworth v(S), with
the convention that v(∅) = 0. A game 〈N, v〉 is said to be inessential if for all coalitions S ⊆ N, v(S) =∑
i∈S v({i}). For a given game 〈N, v〉, its dual game 〈N, v∗〉 is deﬁned as v∗(S) := v(N) − v(N \ S), for all
S ⊆ N. Throughout this note, the solution theory for cooperative TU-games deals with so-called values
 that associate a vector(N, v) ∈ Rn with every n-person game 〈N, v〉.
The set Gn of n-person cooperative TU-games may be identiﬁed with the vector space Rm, where
m = 2n − 1. Let Q be the m × m matrix1 deﬁned by Qv = v∗ for all games 〈N, v〉. As the operator ∗ is a
duality, Q is an involution. Shapley [2] introduced the well-known Shapley value on Gn as the unique
value satisfying linearity, efﬁciency, symmetry, and the dummy player property. Let MSh denote the
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1 The matrix Q is given by almost all zero entries except for [Q ]S,N = 1, for all coalitions S ⊆ N and if S /= N, [Q ]S,N\S = −1.
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n × m representation matrix2 of the Shapley value onGn. It is well-known that the Shapley values of
the dual game and its initial game coincide, that is the matrix equationMShQ = MSh holds.
Hamiache [1] introduced a linear mapping with m × m representation matrix Mλ such that the
associated consistency holds for the Shapley value, that isMShMλ = MSh, for all λ ∈ R. Secondly, Hami-
ache [1] and Xu et al. [3,4] proved by matrix approach that, for all 0 < λ < 2n , the sequence {(Mλ)k}∞k=1
of matrices is convergent with limit the inessentialm × mmatrixM the rows of which, indexed by all
coalitions, are obtained as the sums of row(s) ofMSh, indexed by their individualmember(s). Hamiache
concluded that the Shapley value on Gn is fully characterized by associated consistency, continuity,
and the inessential game property.
The goal of this note is to highlight the matrix similarity between the matrices Mλ and QMλQ in
order to replace the matrix version of associated consistency by its fully equivalent matrix version
of the so-called dual similar associated consistency given by MSh(QMλQ ) = MSh, for all λ ∈ R. For all
0 < λ < 2n , the sequence {(QMλQ )k}∞k=1 of matrices is convergent with limitM, too.
Theorem 1. The Shapley value is the unique value on Gn satisfying dual similar consistency, continuity,
and the inessential game property.
Finally, we present for any game 〈N, v〉, the game theoretic version of the dual similar associated
game 〈N, (QMλQ )v〉 as follows3: for all S ⊆ N,
((QMλQ )v)(S) = v(S) + λ
∑
j∈S
[(v(N) − v(N \ {j})) − (v(S) − v(S \ {j}))].
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2 The representation matrix MSh is given by [MSh]i,S = (s−1)!(n−s)!n! if i ∈ S, and [MSh]i,S = − s!(n−s−1)!n! if i /∈ S, for all players i ∈ N
and all coalitions S ⊆ N.
3 Any member j ∈ S contributes ∇v(S, j) = v(S) − v(S \ {j}) to the formation of the coalition S itself, whereas its contribution to
the formation of the grand coalition N equals ∇v(N, j) = v(N) − v(N \ {j}). The dual similar associated game revalues the initial
game by measuring the weighted gain of the overall marginal contribution ∇v(N, j) over the coalitional marginal contribution
∇v(S, j) of all members j ∈ S.
